FLUCONOMICS—PRESERVING OUR HOSPITAL INFRASTRUCTURE
DURING AND AFTER A PANDEMIC
Vickie J. Williams1
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the fall of 1918, the “Spanish Flu” swept through the United States.2
More than 25 percent of the United States population became ill.3 The Spanish Flu killed
2.5 percent of those infected.4 In a normal flu year, only one-tenth of 1 percent of flu
victims die.5 Estimates of the total number of deaths from the Spanish Flu world-wide
range from 20 million to more than 100 million.6 If a similar pandemic7 occurred today,
with a similar mortality rate, 1.5 million Americans would die.8
In addition to the human costs, there are significant economic consequences that
would follow from an influenza pandemic similar to the Spanish flu pandemic. The
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United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (hereinafter, the CDC)
estimates that the direct and indirect medical costs in the United States associated with a
“medium-level” influenza pandemic would range from $71 billion to $167 billion.9
Influenza pandemics occur with some regularity, although they are usually not as deadly
as the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic. The Asian influenza pandemic of 1957 and the Hong
Kong influenza pandemic of 1968 were not as deadly as the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic,
but did engender high rates of social disruption.10 Virtually all experts agree that it is not
a question of if another influenza pandemic as deadly as the Spanish flu will occur, but a
question of when.11
How will the nation’s hospitals cope with a pandemic of this nature? Even if they
can cope with the immediate impact of the pandemic, will they survive the ordeal? Will
they act in the best interests of the public’s health, even if it causes them economic
injury? Or will they follow the old adage that “those who turn and run away, live to fight
another day,” and protect their bottom lines, even if it means a less-than-optimal response
to a public health emergency such as a pandemic? How can we ensure that hospitals
comply with, rather than defy, orders of public health authorities that may be adverse to
their economic interests during the next pandemic or other public health emergency?
Most hospitals in the United States are privately owned, and an increasing number of
them are investor-owned for-profit enterprises.12 The shift from non-profit to for-profit
status, coupled with the fragmented manner in which we finance health care in this
9
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country, necessitate consideration of issues of cost and compensation in advance of a
public health emergency.13 A plan for ensuring the economic viability of hospitals and
for allocating financial responsibility for the hospitals during and after a pandemic among
government entities and the private sector is of utmost importance.14
This article discusses the likely economic consequences of a naturally occurring
infectious disease pandemic on our nation’s hospitals and how to ensure that they act to
benefit the public during such a pandemic, without forcing them to incur irreparable
economic damage.15 Recent examples of provider behavior during limited outbreaks of
infectious disease demonstrate that monetary assurances sufficient to ensure a health care
provider’s survival, both during and after such an outbreak, are crucial to ensuring quick
and complete compliance with the orders of local public health officials. Despite the
evidence that provider worries about economic survival hamper the efforts of public
health officials to protect the public’s health, current law does not provide adequate
assurances to health care providers that they will emerge from a public health emergency
relatively unscathed. Although numerous public health emergency legal preparedness
plans exist or are under development, they fail to address the fundamental question of
how our health care system will survive a public health emergency that is all but certain
to occur.16
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Unless the law provides assurances that compliance with the orders of public
health officials will not constitute economic suicide for hospitals, we are unlikely to get
quick and complete cooperation from them in containing a developing infectious disease
pandemic. Failure of our first-line responders to comply with the orders of public health
officials could prove disastrous to any effort to protect the public from outbreaks of
infectious disease.
Part II of this article explores the likely economic effects of an infectious disease
pandemic on our nation’s health care providers, both during and after the emergency.
Using examples of provider behavior from the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1917-1918, the
more recent outbreaks of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in several
countries around the world in 2002-2003, and an isolated outbreak of monkeypox in the
American mid-west in 2003, this discussion demonstrates the need for economic
assurances for hospitals and medical staff to ensure that they act in the best interests of
the public during an outbreak of infectious disease.
Part III demonstrates that existing law fails to address the economic needs of
hospitals dealing with a pandemic. New legislation, and reinterpretation of existing law,
are needed to ensure that money is available to compensate hospitals not only for the
direct costs of providing care to pandemic victims during an outbreak, but also for the
losses hospitals will incur by refraining from providing other care during a pandemic, and
for the lingering economic damage they will experience because of the social stigma of
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having been designated as an isolation or quarantine center by public health authorities
during a pandemic.
Part IV of the article proposes that we provide legal assurances to the nation’s
hospitals that they will survive the economic effects of a pandemic. These assurances
include creation of a fund earmarked to compensate hospitals for the direct costs of
caring for pandemic victims, legislating a partnership between the federal government
and the private insurance industry designed to offset losses that will be caused by
disruption of the normal system of health care financing engendered by a pandemic, and
re-interpreting the Takings Clause to compensate hospitals for their losses to goodwill
due to their compliance with the orders of public health officials during a pandemic.
These proposals will align the interests of hospitals with those of the public during an
infectious disease pandemic, ensuring that hospitals will be fully compensated if they
fulfill their roles as guardians of the public health during an infectious disease pandemic,
and that our hospitals will emerge intact after the pandemic is over.
II.

THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF AN INFECTIOUS DISEASE
PANDEMIC ON THE NATION’S HOSPITALS

Although it is impossible to predict precisely how a pandemic will impact
American hospitals, it is indisputable that a pandemic will have both an immediate
impact on hospital finances, and a lingering negative economic effect that could be even
more devastating in the long-term. At the very minimum, adequate preparation for a
pandemic must include financial incentives designed to encourage hospitals to act
contrary to their long and short-term financial interests in favor of the immediate health
needs of the general public.
A.

The Immediate Economic Impact of a Pandemic on Hospitals.

5

When we think of hospitals’ costs of responding to a pandemic, we think of the
direct costs of using hospitals and their associated medical personnel to isolate and care
for sick individuals. Isolation of sick individuals, and quarantine of healthy individuals
who may have been exposed to a dangerous communicable disease, have been used to
control the spread of disease since the earliest recorded human history.17 Nevertheless, a
historical review of the costs incurred by hospitals in caring for isolated and quarantined
individuals during an infectious disease outbreak has limited, if any, value in helping us
determine what costs hospitals will incur should a pandemic occur today. Until the
discovery of antibiotics in the mid-20th century, people were relatively helpless to treat
infectious disease. Therefore, it was not necessary to isolate sick individuals in a place
where they could receive skilled medical care, such as the equivalent of the modern
hospital. At the most, isolated persons suffering from infectious disease were offered
palliative care, which required little medical skill or technology.18 Rather than using
hospital-like facilities, isolation and quarantine were generally enforced in the location
where the infected or exposed person first appeared within the jurisdiction of the officials
charged with isolation and quarantine authority, such as on an arriving ship.19 Even when
hospital facilities were used for isolation, as they were for persons debarking from ships
in New York City in the 19th century, they were usually facilities specially dedicated to
isolation and palliative care, rather than active treatment of disease.20 Places that were
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used to isolate patients suffering from infectious disease were generally known as
“pesthouses,” and were avoided by upstanding citizens at all costs.21
Some of the earliest uses of general hospital facilities in the United States for
isolation of sick patients occurred during the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918.

For

example, San Francisco’s first case of Spanish flu was reported in the newspaper on
September 24, 1918.22 On October 14, 1918 the chief of San Francisco’s Board of Health
met with the superintendents of the city’s hospitals.23 They decided to move all of the
patients who were not suffering from Spanish flu out of the San Francisco Hospital, and
use it to isolate Spanish flu patients.24 Ultimately, the San Francisco Hospital admitted
3,509 pandemic victims, and 26% of them died.25
The Spanish flu epidemic occurred at a time when the United States was
beginning to experience the development of general acute care hospitals. Nevertheless,
there are a number of differences between the Spanish flu pandemic and any future
pandemic that make even an analysis of costs incurred by hospitals during this pandemic
unhelpful as a basis from which to extrapolate the costs to hospitals of treating victims of
a modern pandemic. First, many Spanish flu victims were treated in makeshift isolation
centers. In San Francisco, emergency hospitals were improvised wherever there were
large, empty, and dry buildings.26 Also, because the pandemic occurred while the United
States was in the thick of World War I, many victims were treated in military facilities.
And on military bases, conditions were even more makeshift than they were in the
21
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civilian world. At Camp Devens, Massachusetts, the base hospital was designed to hold
1,200 men.27

In September 1918, it held in excess of 6,000, and men were in every

corridor, spare room, and porch.28
Significant advances in medicine have rendered the type of care rendered to
pandemic victims during the Spanish flu epidemic inadequate and unacceptable to
today’s American public. Therefore, the costs incurred in rendering such care are would
grossly understate medical costs in a modern analysis. The Spanish flu swept the world
in the days before antibiotics and antiviral drugs were available.

Because the vast

majority of care given to Spanish flu victims was palliative, it made little difference to the
victim’s chances of survival whether the victim was in an acute care hospital, a makeshift
emergency hospital, a military field hospital, or at home.

There was no public

expectation that Spanish flu victims would be treated in a hospital intensive care unit, or
that life-support equipment, or any of the other technologically advanced (and expensive)
life-sustaining advances we have come to associate with a modern hospital, would be
available to the pandemic victims.29
Another reason why using the economic effect of the Spanish flu on health care
providers to estimate the economic consequences of a similar outbreak on hospitals today
is not useful is because of the radical changes in financing of our hospitals since 1918. In
1918 hospitals were financed mostly by charitable donations, public funds, and a steadily
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increasing, but still relatively small, proportion of privately insured patients.30 Placing
pandemic victims in hospitals did not disrupt the hospital’s financial operations the way
that it would today.
Today, the American health care delivery system is financed by a hodge-podge of
public and private sources.31 In 2001, 34.8% of personal health care costs were covered
by private health insurance, 45.4% of personal health care costs were paid by the federal
and state governments, and 14.4% of personal health care costs were paid out-of-pocket
by patients.32 As part of this system, substantially higher prices may be systematically
paid by one payer group (usually the private health insurers) to offset lower prices paid
by another (usually the federal and state governments).33 This “cost-shift hydraulic” is
very prominent in the hospital payment system. In 2002, private insurers paid on the
average 122% of costs for hospital services, while the federal and state governments paid
approximately 90% of costs for the same services.34 This cost-shifting allows hospitals to
provide social benefits to the community, such as teaching, research, standby capacity,
and charity care.35 A pandemic that disrupts the payer mix of a health care provider, both
immediately and in the long-term, decreases the number of patients covered by private
insurers and increases the number of publicly insured or self-pay patients, is likely to
have a major impact on the viability of ongoing hospital operations and a devastating
30
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effect on the social benefits to the community that hospitals provide with the funds they
receive through the cost-shift hydraulic. Hospitals and American society did not have to
face this possibility during any past pandemic episode.
In addition, looking at the direct medical costs hospitals incurred in the past for
caring for pandemic victims, and trying to extrapolate that to the modern American
hospital, will not truly reflect the hospital’s total costs of providing such care. Generally,
hospitals today are not paid for their actual costs. Most payers pay hospitals based on a
formula used to set a rate for an entire course of treatment for a particular diagnosis
(commonly called the Diagnosis Related Group, or DRG).36

The DRG in theory

represents the cost to an efficient hospital of caring for an average case presenting with a
particular principal diagnosis, as determined upon admission to the hospital.37 Hospitals
often compete to attract the type of cases for which DRG compensation is comparatively
generous (such as uncomplicated cases with few complicating factors within a particular
DRG, or orthopedic, cardiac and general surgical cases for which the DRG amount is
relatively generous) in order to offset the costs of providing services for which the DRG
does not accurately reflect total costs of care.38 The DRG is only the starting point for
determining the hospital’s reimbursement.39 DRG payments are adjusted to compensate
teaching hospitals for the costs of operating an educational program, for extraordinarily
expensive or “outlier” cases, and for the particular circumstances of the hospital (rural
versus urban, hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low-income patients).40 If a
36
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hospital is unable to sustain its usual case-mix of relatively highly reimbursed DRGs and
relatively poorly reimbursed DRGs, because it has been designated as an isolation or
quarantine center during a pandemic, it will suffer losses even if it is ultimately
compensated for the direct medical costs of caring for pandemic victims. The designation
of a hospital as the isolation hospital during an infectious disease outbreak for an
extended period of time might mean bankruptcy.41
Nevertheless, there are some historical lessons we can learn from past pandemics
regarding the financial effects of pandemics on the nation’s hospitals. In a normal flu
year, influenza results in 114,000 hospitalizations, and between 5 and 10 million
outpatient visits.42

If we experience an influenza pandemic, the federal government

estimates a three to seven-fold increase in hospitalizations, and a four-fold increase in
outpatient visits.43 The Centers for Disease Control has estimated the medical costs for
an influenza pandemic as follows:44
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Fig. 1 - Costs (direct and indirect)45 of influenza pandemic per gross attack rate:a deaths,
hospitalizations, outpatients, illnesses, and total costs (in 1995 US$)
Cost per gross attack rate ($ millions)

Deaths
Mean
5th percentile
95th percentile
Hospitalizations
Mean

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

59,288
23,800
94,907

79,051
31,733
126,543

98,814
39,666
158,179

118,577
47,599
189,815

138,340
55,532
221,451

1,928

2,571

3,214

3,856

5th percentile
95th percentile
Outpatients
Mean
5th percentile
95th percentile

1,250
2,683

1,667
3,579

2,084
4,472

2,501
5,367

4,499
2,917
6,261

5,708
4,871
6,557

7,611
6,495
8,742

9,513
8,119
10,928

11,416
9,742
13,113

13,318
11,366
15,299

Ill, no medical care soughtb
Mean
5th percentile
95th percentile

4,422
3,270
5,557

5,896
4,360
7,409

7,370
5,450
9,262

8,844
6,540
11,114

10,317
7,629
12,967

71,346
35,405
106,988

95,128
47,206
142,650

118,910
59,008
178,313

142,692
70,810
213,975

166,474
82,611
249,638

Grand totals
Mean
5th percentile
95th percentile
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Gross attack rate = percentage of clinical influenza illness per population.
Persons who become clinically ill due to influenza but do not seek medical care; illness has an economic impact (e.g., half day off work).

b
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The mean total medical costs of an influenza pandemic with a gross attack rate of
25%, which is similar to the gross attack rate of the Spanish flu pandemic, are predicted
to exceed $118 billion. The bulk of those costs are attributable to the costs incurred in
caring for victims who ultimately die, who will consume an intensive amount of hospital
services and staff time. Much of this cost takes the form of enhanced staffing and
hospital bed capacity that will be needed to handle a pandemic.46 Although federal, state,
and local government have provided enhanced funding for emergency preparedness since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, including funds to develop hospital surge
capacity for outbreaks of infectious disease,47 the question of who will pay for the actual
care of each individual pandemic victim remains fraught with uncertainty. Although
presumably the public and private insurers of persons who are actually ill should pay for
their treatment, if the insurer does not have a preexisting contractual relationship with the
isolation center, and the pandemic victim is at that particular institution because of the
orders of public health authorities, the insurer may balk at paying for the hospital stay.
Likewise, the government, knowing that a patient is privately insured, is likely to insist
that the private insurer pay for the patient’s care.

This inevitable debate between

insurers, the government, and the hospital about payment rates will be a significant
distraction at a time when healthcare resources should be directed to dealing with the
public health emergency. Many hospitals will be tempted to avoid this outcome by doing

46
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everything in their power to avoid being designated as an isolation center, even if they are
the most suitable places to treat pandemic victims.
Hospitals may also be used as quarantine centers for healthy individuals, such as
health care workers who were exposed to the disease but are not sick themselves.48 Both
our private and public funding mechanisms for health care delivery are driven by the
concept of payment for specific diagnoses of illnesses.49 Typically, payers make no
payment for custodial care of people who are not ill. A hospital that is designated as a
quarantine center is likely to be at even greater financial risk than a hospital functioning
as an isolation center, and thus, is extremely likely to resist the designation. Failure to
quarantine people who have come into contact with pandemic victims at the place where
they first come into contact with them, very possibly a hospital, as was the case during
the SARS outbreak, will lead to increased spread of the pandemic disease in the general
population.50 Even when feelings of civic duty and patriotism are running high, hospitals
will be reluctant to endanger their financial health and their medical staff by complying
with such orders. For example, after 9/11 and the episode of anthrax bioterrorism that
closely followed, response to the Centers for Disease Control’s request that hospitals
prepare themselves to accept patients in the event of an emergency quarantine was
sluggish, at best. 51
B.

Hospital Resources Will Be Needed To Provide Financial Incentives for
Medical Personnel

48
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Along with the anticipated increase in hospital inpatient and outpatient visits in
the event of a pandemic, there will be an increase in the need for medical personnel to
care for the sick. Despite the need, history tells us that many health care workers, from
physicians to orderlies, will refuse to treat patients with new and emerging infectious
diseases.52 At the very least, a substantial increase in pay will be required to recruit and
retain sufficient health care workers during a pandemic.
For example, the existing supply of health care workers was no match for the
numbers of patients with Spanish Flu in 1918. Many health care workers came down
with the flu themselves, further exacerbating the shortage of medical personnel available
to care for the sick.53 The American Red Cross and the United States Public Health
Service were inundated with wires begging for help.54 Unable to meet the demand,
despite heroic efforts to track down any and all available health care workers,55 they
called upon civic-minded housewives, retired nurses and doctors, medical and dental
students, and all able-bodied citizens who were not in the military to tend to the
thousands of sick patients in the emergency hospitals, and to provide supplies and
essential services, such as sanitation, that were disrupted because of the large amount of
workers out with the flu.56 Although many people responded to the call for help, the
number of volunteers was not sufficient to meet the need.57 In San Francisco, during the
height of its Spanish Flu epidemic, the Red Cross offered practical nurses $20 per week if

52
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they would report for work, but still could not fill the needs of the city.58 Most other
American cities experienced similar shortages.

Some nurses were forcibly held in

patients’ homes to care for the sick.59
During the more recent SARS outbreak, because so many doctors and nurses were
resigning rather than be forced to treat patients with SARS, hospitals in Taiwan were
forced to offer “danger pay” to those working with SARS patients.60

In Vietnam,

personnel treating SARS patients received a government allowance of five times the
amount normally given to health care workers.61 These stipends were paid initially by
each medical institution treating SARS patients, and were ultimately reimbursed to the
hospital by the government.62
Even substantial financial incentives may be insufficient to recruit and retain
needed medical personnel.

During the SARS outbreak in Taiwan, 160 health care

workers resigned rather than work with SARS patients.63 In Toronto, Lucy Smith, a
nurse with 17 years’ experience, refused to work with SARS patients despite an order
from the hospital where she worked to do so, and an offer of increased pay.64 When
discussing her reasons for refusing to work with SARS patients, Ms. Smith cited the fact
that she had three children and an immunocompromised mother, and cited her
responsibility to them as well as her responsibility to her patients.65 As Dr. Peter Singer,
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director of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics explained in response to
questions regarding Ms. Smith’s position, there is a “threshold beyond which health care
workers aren’t obliged to take personal risks. We don’t expect firefighters to jump into a
burning pit, or police officers to throw themselves in front of a bullet.”66
There is no reason to believe that Americans will behave more selflessly than
their Canadian, Vietnamese, or Taiwanese counterparts when faced with an infectious
disease outbreak. In fact, there is reason to believe that they will behave even more selfprotectively. Many of the Asian countries that experienced SARS outbreaks are known
for their communitarian cultures.67

Canada is known for a commitment to social

solidarity, especially in the area of health care and its health care system.68 Their cultures
contrast sharply with American culture, which has a strong tradition of individualism and
skepticism about government.69
The American tradition of individualism and minimal government intervention
with personal liberty has been evident during public health emergencies in the past.
During the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918, although many health care workers did their
jobs and died doing so, many people fled even from their own loved ones who came
down with the flu.70 The sheer inability of hospitals to deal with a sudden surge in
patient demand was compounded by the failure of trained medical personnel to show up
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for work, not only because they themselves were ill, but because of fear of contact with
the sick.71 Towns that were not hit during the Spanish flu pandemic’s first wave, and had
notice of the coming pandemic and thus had time to prepare, enforced complete isolation
from their surroundings at gunpoint.72 Although this method of enforced quarantine was
apparently effective,73 it does not evidence a willingness for self-sacrifice on the part of
Americans in the face of epidemic disease.
Nor has the attitude of American health care workers towards self-sacrifice in the
face of epidemic disease appear to have improved since 1918. In the 1980’s, when it
became known that H.I.V. could be transmitted through bodily fluids, doctors and other
health care providers turned away AIDS patients.74

In June 2003, a physician in

Rockford, Illinois who volunteered to treat a girl with monkeypox75 incurred the wrath of
his physician partners, who felt that his contact with the girl would put them all at risk.76
Fears of bioterrorism can also fuel health care workers’ reluctance to treat.

One

physician with small children who treated a monkeypox patient explained that prior to a
definitive diagnosis, he feared a bioterror attack of smallpox: “My attitude was, I’m
going to stay as far away from this guy as possible.”77 The physician’s experience with
monkeypox has convinced him that he would not volunteer for anything dangerous in the
future, and that he would not be “turned into” a first responder in a public health
71
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emergency.78 A study from the fall of 2003 found that more than 50 percent of doctors
would not accept a smallpox vaccination, 67 percent would not treat smallpox without
having been vaccinated, and only 55 percent of doctors surveyed agreed that physicians
have an obligation to care for patients even if it might endanger their own health.79
In modern society, the American tradition of individualism in health care has
become even more entrenched than it was in the past because of structural changes in the
way health care is delivered. The advent of managed care, greater compartmentalization
of care, and the lack of a statement of a duty to treat in professional organizations’
mission statements and ethical guidelines are all cited as reasons for the erosion of a
sense of community in American health care.80 Financial incentives to care for victims of
an infectious disease pandemic alone will not reverse this erosion, nor ensure an ample
supply of health care workers in an emergency. Nevertheless, they represent one step
towards ensuring that those who do step forward are rewarded for their courage and
community-minded spirit, or at least, treated equitably. Nurses and other front-line
medical personnel will look to their employers, generally the hospitals, to pay the
financial incentives that will be required to attempt to care for isolated and quarantined
persons. Hospitals must have resources available to make these payments.
C.

The Lingering Economic Effects of a Pandemic on Hospitals.
Even if provisions are made to compensate hospitals used as isolation centers

during a pandemic, or as quarantine centers for healthy individuals, any means of
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alleviating the economic burden of a pandemic on the nation’s hospitals and ensuring
compliance with the orders of public health officials must account for the economic aftereffects of the hospital’s designation as a “pesthouse.” American history is rife with
examples of the subsequent undesirability and perceived unmarketability of places used
to quarantine and/or isolate persons with infectious diseases such as smallpox or
leprosy.81 During the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918, property owners who protested the
taking of their property by local public health officials for quarantine or isolation centers,
fearing the lingering stigma of having been the “pesthouse” would hurt their business
after the epidemic ended, found no sympathy from local health officers. For example, in
response to a complaint filed by a hotel owner protesting the commandeering of his
property for an emergency flu hospital, a health official in Spokane, Washington
reportedly said: “We don’t care a rap what the owners of the building think about it or
about us. . . . This is a very serious emergency and if the owners of the Lion Hotel think
they can put a dollar on one side of the scale and a human life on the other and get away
with it, they are very, very badly mistaken.”82
81

See, e.g., Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387 (S.C. 1909) (describing a house formerly used to isolate persons
with smallpox as a “pesthouse,” and describing the efforts of an elderly citizen of the city with leprosy to
avoid being sent to live there); J.A. Brown v. County of Pierce, 68 P. 872 ( Wash. 1902) (claiming a right
to compensation from the city of Tacoma for the full value of property used by the city as a “pesthouse” for
the isolation and quarantine of persons with smallpox because by such use the marketable value of the
property was destroyed).
82
Heather Lalley, Flu Outbreak of 1918 Proved Devastating to Spokane, World, SPOKANE SPOKESMANREVIEW, November 18, 2004, at D8. Of course, we live in a different world today. Through the
ascendancy of private health insurance as the primary method of payment for hospital care in the years
since 1918, the efforts to control rising health care costs since the 1970’s, and the most recent appearance
of consumer-driven health care spending, Americans are used to a health care system that weighs expenses
against human life. The recent debate in California and other states about mandating nurse staffing ratios
in hospitals is a good example of the prevalence of weighing cost against life in our health care delivery
system. A recent study shows that trimming a nurse’s workload by a single patient can save lives, but costs
between $24,000 and $136,000. Michael B. Rothberg, Ivo Abraham, Peter K. Lindenauer, and David N.
Rose, Improving Nurse-to-Patient Staffing Ratios as a Cost-Effective Safety Intervention, 43 MEDICAL
CARE 8 (August 2005). Hospitals and legislators are using the study to debate the wisdom of mandating a
nurse-to-patient ratio in Massachusetts. Melanie Evans, Putting a price on care, MODERN HEALTHCARE,
August 8, 2005, at 14.

21

Hospitals are not immune from the stigma of being designated the “pesthouse.”
Scarborough Hospital in Toronto, Canada was the first hospital in Toronto to isolate
SARS patients.83

Scarborough’s first SARS patient experienced a long wait in the

hospital emergency department (18-20 hours) before SARS was suspected.84 Therefore,
persons who entered the hospital after the first patient, but before adequate infection
control measures had been implemented, were asked to adhere to a 10-day home
quarantine.85 Subsequently, four hospitals were designated as SARS facilities in the
city.86 Despite the cessation of the SARS outbreak by the summer of 2003, Scarborough
Hospital continued to experience a loss in patients and severe stigma as a “pesthouse”
long after the outbreak ended.87
If a similar patient boycott occurred in an American hospital, the loss of lucrative
privately insured patients, who, under the cost-shifting that is ubiquitous in our financing
system for hospitals, subsidize other patients and socially beneficial hospital services,
would seriously challenge a hospital’s financial viability. The affected hospitals would
be left caring for only patients who had no choice of providers—generally, the publicly
funded patients whose care is paid by the government at less than cost, or uninsured
patients who cannot pay at all. This would exacerbate the precarious financial position
the hospital would experience after a public health emergency.
Privately owned hospitals will be particularly sensitive to social stigma. Not-forprofit privately owned hospitals rely on their ability to issue and sell bonds to the public
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to finance their capital needs, and for-profit privately owned hospitals are dependent
upon the capital markets for their needs. If the public fears going to a particular hospital
because of its prior designation as an isolation or quarantine facility, the hospital will
have great difficulty attracting investment in either the bond or stock markets. The
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina on the privately owned hospitals in the New Orleans area
illustrates the effect that a major disruption in the hospital’s normal business activities
due to a natural disaster can have on the hospital’s ability to resume its normal activities
when the disruption ceases. In New Orleans, even hospitals that were not physically
damaged by the hurricane have remained closed since the disaster, due to lack of funds to
reopen.88 Whether they reopen or not is entirely dependent on the capital markets.89
Therefore, ensuring hospital compliance with the orders of public health officials
during an infectious disease pandemic will require assuring providers that they will be
protected from the direct and indirect costs of caring for pandemic victims, from the loss
of the ability to cost-shift during the pandemic, and from probable loss of business and
the ability to cost-shift after the pandemic is over.
III.

THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING LAW TO PROTECT OUR
HOSPITALS FROM THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A
PANDEMIC

A financially sound hospital system before, during, and after a public health
emergency is critical to the public’s health and the economic and social recovery of a
region.90 The law is our primary mechanism for ensuring that our hospital system remains
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sound after a pandemic.91 Nevertheless, although public health systems and hospitals are
heavily regulated at the federal, state, and local government levels, current law does not
ensure the financial health and continued viability of the nation’s hospitals during and
after an infectious disease pandemic. Although government officials and the private
sector have been paying increased attention to legal preparedness for a public health
emergency in recent years, these efforts fail to address the economic hardships that
hospitals will face during and after a pandemic. Therefore, they will fail to achieve their
essential purpose of ensuring that the hospitals and other first-responders are ready and
available to respond to a pandemic, and are ready and available to resume their vital
function in our health care delivery system after the pandemic subsides. The following
sections discuss existing federal and state laws that are commonly cited as economic
protectors for the nation’s hospitals, and points out their failure to deal with the realities
of hospital finance.
A.

The Takings Clause
On the federal level, there are a number of constitutional provisions,92 statutes,

regulations, and administrative pronouncements that address the economic interests of
health care providers responding to a public health emergency, such as an infectious
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disease pandemic. Nevertheless, they are inadequate to assure complete compensation
for health care providers whose economic interests are adversely affected by compliance
with the orders of public health officials during an outbreak of pandemic disease. They
fail to provide incentives to hospitals and their medical staffs to put their duties as first
responders during a pandemic above their interests in preserving the economic status quo
on which they depend for survival.
Although legal scholars differ about whether protection of wealth and property
was the primary motivating force behind the United States Constitution, there is no doubt
that economic and private property rights were among those the framers sought to
protect.93 The Takings Clause decrees that private property may not be taken for public
use, without just compensation.94 When a hospital receives an order from a public health
official adversely affecting its economic interests, such as an order for isolating sick
patients or quarantining exposed persons, it is likely that the facility will call upon the
courts to decide whether a compensable taking has occurred.

Such a case is likely to

raise a host of vexing questions about what types of government actions constitute
compensable takings.

Clearly government action taken to combat an outbreak of

infectious disease is designed to defeat a “public enemy,” thus presenting a compelling
argument that the action constitutes a taking for public use.95 Nevertheless, according to
the United States Supreme Court, not all private sacrifice s needed to defeat a “public
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enemy” require just compensation under the Takings Clause.96 Rather, the Court has
long held that determining whether a compensable taking has occurred depends on the
type of government action taken, the relative strength of the interests of the public versus
the interests of the affected property owner, the extent of the property owner’s economic
loss, and the reasonable expectations of the property owner.97
Virtually all of these questions are terra incognita in the context of how they
would apply to hospitals’ requests for compensation for economic losses incurred due to
an infectious disease pandemic.

Modern-day Takings Clause jurisprudence has

developed simultaneously with great advances in the fields of medicine and public
health.98 Because of these medical advances, large-scale epidemics requiring isolation
and quarantine of sick persons in modern hospitals are virtually unknown in the United
States. At the same time that advances in medicine and technology made the need for
large-scale isolation and quarantine of persons exposed to infectious disease virtually
obsolete, the Court was interpreting the Takings Clause to require just compensation for
government regulatory actions, both permanent and temporary, that had previously been
considered non-compensable.99 Therefore, 19th-century and early-20th century Takings
Clause jurisprudence, the jurisprudence that existed the last time the United States had to
contemplate the consequences of large-scale isolation and quarantine of infectious
disease victims, has limited utility in the context of analyzing what the courts would do

96

Id.
See Miller, 276 U.S. at 279; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
98
For example, advances in public health have accounted for about twenty-five of the thirty years of
increased life expectancy in the United States since the beginning of the 20th century. LEVY, supra note
91, at 1150.
99
See, e.g. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (establishing that government regulation
of private property may be considered a constitutional “taking,” requiring just compensation, even if the
government does not physically possess the property).
97

26

today if faced with hospital claims for compensation based on their compliance with
isolation and quarantine orders. The courts have rarely, if ever, had an opportunity to
apply the Takings Clause to orders of public health officials closing hospitals or
designating them as isolation or quarantine centers.
Courts decide Takings Clause cases as questions of law, based on the factual
background of each specific case.100 By its own terms, the Takings Clause only applies
when “property” is taken for “public use.” The Court has defined public use broadly, and
has specifically held that government designation of a hospital as an isolation or
quarantine facility is a legitimate exercise of the state’s police powers to protect the
public health.101
Although an order establishing an isolation or quarantine center on private
property is undoubtedly a “public use” within the meaning of the Takings Clause, it is
less certain whether such an order involves a taking of “property.” Physical occupation
of the hospital by the government would clearly involve interference with “property,”
since even a de minimus physical occupation of real property has been held to constitute a
compensable taking.102 An order establishing an isolation or quarantine center at a
hospital could involve a physical occupation of the hospital by the government, but it is
far more likely to constitute a regulatory action directing the hospital to use its premises
in a certain manner, thus disrupting the day-to-day business of the hospital. It is far from
clear whether the hospital’s contracts with insurers and other business associates, and
100
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day-to-day revenue-producing operations are “property” within the meaning of the
Takings Clause. Protecting these intangible interests would be of paramount importance
to a hospital when considering whether to comply with an order designating it an
isolation or quarantine center. The United States Supreme Court has found compensable
takings when government action adversely affects intangible interests such as loss of
repose,103 intellectual property,104 and monetary interest on pooled funds.105 Yet a
hospital would have no certainty as to whether the Takings Clause would protect its
intangible business interests.

Intangible business-related interests have been

characterized as compensable “property” in some types of takings, but have been
characterized as non-compensable losses in others.106
Most commentators and court decisions distinguish between two types of takings
of property:

possessory and regulatory.107 A possessory taking occurs when the

government confiscates or physically occupies private property.108 A permanent physical
occupation of property, no matter how minor, is a compensable taking no matter how
strong the public interest that the government’s action serves.109 If the government
permanently physically occupied a hospital and ran it as an isolation or quarantine
103
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facility, clearly the former owners of the hospital would be entitled to compensation.110
The only question remaining (and it is a big one) would be the proper measure of
damages.
In the relatively straightforward situation of a permanent physical occupation of
property by the government, there is a formula for compensating the former owner of the
property. The value compensable in the case of a permanent physical occupation of
property by the government is the value which is capable of transfer from owner to
owner, i.e., the fair market value of the property at the time of the government’s action,
from the perspective of the owner.111

Nevertheless, the loss to the owner of

nontransferable value deriving from a unique need for the property, or a sentimental or
illogical attachment to it, is treated as a loss for the common good, and is not
compensable.112 Sentimental value or inordinate attachment to a piece of property is not
something that is transferable to the government. Likewise, eminent domain law
generally does not recognize a right to compensation for destruction of business
goodwill, provided the former owner is free to pick up and continue her business
elsewhere.113 The government must only pay for what it gets, not for what the owner
loses.114 In the normal possessory taking, business goodwill and going-concern value are
not considered compensable “property.”

The government does not receive these
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interests, because it does not continue to operate the property seized as a business. These
types of losses are treated as the price of citizenship, and as a sacrifice to the greater good
of the community.115
Thus, if the government seizes a hospital, and subsequently shuts it down,
compensation based on the fair market value of the property seized (i.e., the land,
equipment, and fixtures) might be considered constitutionally adequate. After all, the
former hospital owners would not receive back from the government a hospital with a
significantly diminished value some time in the future, which they will have to rebuild
into a viable business enterprise. They would not have to entice paying patients back to
the hospital after it ceases being an isolation or quarantine center. They would not need
to assure potential patients or insurers that a feared infectious disease was completely
gone from the hospital, or that the hospital was once again capable of delivering the same
type of quality care they had come to expect from it before it was appropriated by the
government. If the hospital owners wished to engage in the business of operating a
general acute care hospital again, they could take the fair market value payment they
received from the government for the hospital’s tangible assets, find a new location, and
start over, pointing to their record as owners of a successful acute care hospital prior to
the government’s actions as support for their new business.116 No lingering stigma of a
hospital having been designated as the “pesthouse” will follow them to their new
business venture. Theoretically, hospital owners can re-establish their relationships with
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insurers, suppliers, and employees on the same or similar terms to those they had
previously negotiated, with no ill effects.
Although the government has the legal authority to physically occupy a hospital
and run it as an isolation or quarantine facility, even if it did so, it is highly unlikely that
such an occupation would be permanent.

When the immediate public health crisis

subsides, and the government no longer needs the hospital, it will most likely return the
hospital to the owners. The owners of a business that has been temporarily occupied by
the government and run as a going concern, and then returned to the owners after the
government’s need for the business ends, are in a much different position than the owners
of a business that is permanently appropriated by the government. Unlike business
owners whose business is gone forever, it is not financially feasible for business owners
who know that they will get their business back at some point in the future to open a new
version of their old business while the government is occupying their old business. If
they do, they are likely to find themselves with two identical businesses at some point,
neither of which can be operated at a profit because of the existence of the other
business.117

This temporary interruption of the owner’s business narrows the range of

alternatives open to the owner so much, that it increases the government’s obligation to
him.118 Although the usual measure of damages for a temporary possessory taking is the
fair rental value of the property for the time period it is used by the government,119 when
the government’s actions have so narrowed the range of alternatives available to the
property owner, the government may be required to pay for the loss of going-concern
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value or goodwill experienced by the owner due to the government’s actions.120 In this
situation, the government is receiving the going-concern value and goodwill of the
business, and these interests are considered compensable property.
Although the government has the power to occupy and operate a hospital during a
public health emergency, it is far more likely that public health authorities will rely on
their statutory or regulatory power to designate hospitals as isolation and quarantine
facilities, and require the hospital to comply with those orders, while the owners remain
in possession and continue to operate the hospital.121 If this type of government action
qualifies as a taking at all, it would constitute a regulatory taking. There is no set formula
for determining when government regulation has gone “too far” in encroaching on the
rights of private property owners, and constitutes a regulatory taking.122 It is well-settled
that if government action permanently deprives a property owner of all economically
beneficial use of her property, the government must pay the owner just compensation.123
In such a case, business goodwill and going concern value may be compensable property,
as they are when there is a temporary possessory taking of a going business concern,
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especially if the government has made it impossible, through regulation or otherwise, for
the former business owners to engage in their former business elsewhere.124
Nevertheless, this “per se” rule of compensation does not apply to a temporary
regulatory taking, even if the regulation does deprive the property owner of all beneficial
use of her property while it is in effect.125 For temporary regulatory actions, whether a
compensable taking has occurred is an unqualified “maybe.”126 Furthermore, the Court
has cautioned against applying precedents from possessory takings cases to regulatory
takings cases, making analysis of temporary regulatory takings cases even more
constricted and fact-specific.127
For the vast majority of regulatory takings cases, both permanent and temporary,
the Court has applied a three-factor test to determine if compensation is due to the
property owners, known as the Penn Central test.128 The primary Penn Central factors
are: The economic impact of the regulation on the property owner; the extent to which
the regulation interferes with investment-backed expectations; and the character of the
governmental action.129 The inquiry is specific to the facts of each case, making it
virtually impossible to predict in advance whether or not a particular government action
will result in a compensable taking.
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The law regarding the availability of compensation for goodwill and going
concern value in the event of designation of a hospital as an isolation or quarantine
facility during a pandemic is summarized in Figure 2:
Fig 2: Availability of compensation for loss of goodwill and going concern
value for designation as an isolation or quarantine center
Government
Physically Government
Issues
Occupies and Runs the Orders Designating the
Hospital
Hospital as an Isolation or
Quarantine
Center,
Hospital Continues to Be
Operated by Owners
Maybe
Temporary Designation of Yes
Hospital as an Isolation or
Quarantine Facility
Permanent Designation of No, unless the condemnor Yes, but only if owner is
of
all
Hospital as an Isolation or continues to run the deprived
business as a hospital and economically beneficial use
Quarantine Facility
thus makes use of the of property.
hospital’s
accumulated
goodwill.

In the context of an order designating a hospital as a temporary isolation or
quarantine center, one could imagine the myriad of fact-specific inquiries that would
plague the courts under the Penn Central test. For example, with regard to the economic
impact of the regulation on the property owner, should loss to the hospital be offset by
any payment made to the hospital by the public health authorities for caring for isolated
or quarantined people? What are the hospital’s true damages, given the cost-shifting
phenomenon and the convoluted nature of hospital payments structures? What kind of
investment-backed expectations exist for private non-profit hospitals, and how does a
charitable mission factor into these expectations? With regard to the character of the
government action, shouldn’t hospitals, which are heavily regulated by the state, expect
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to be subject to orders of this nature, and therefore have no vested property right in the
ability to carry on their business during a public health emergency?130
The most likely hospital scenario is a temporary regulatory designation as an
isolation or quarantine facility. Under current Takings Clause jurisprudence, the only
thing that is certain in this scenario is that a hospital will have the opportunity to argue
about whether it is entitled to receive any compensation from the government. And even
if it convinces a court that the Penn Central factors militate in favor of compensation, it
must then argue that the Court’s possessory Takings Clause jurisprudence allowing
compensation for goodwill and going-concern value in certain circumstances should
apply to a temporary regulatory taking, an analogy that the Court has discouraged.131 And
even if it convinces the court that goodwill and going-concern value are compensable
property in the case of a temporary regulatory taking, these are notoriously hard to
quantify, stumping even a scholar of law and economics of the caliber of Justice Felix
Frankfurter.132
The uncertainty of availability, type, or amount of compensation available under
the Takings Clause prevents it from acting as an incentive for hospitals to comply with
the orders of public health authorities during a pandemic. In the case of a wide-scale
public health emergency requiring multiple isolation and quarantine centers capable of
using sophisticated medical technology, the threat of massive amounts of litigation
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regarding the entitlement to, and amount of compensation due to hospitals will not only
cool the eagerness of hospitals to comply with the orders of public health authorities, but
could also temper the government’s response to the emergency, cause delay, and
adversely affect the public’s health. The undeveloped state of o ur Takings Clause
jurisprudence in the context of public health emergencies provides hospitals with
incentives to protect themselves by resisting such orders in the first place, rather than
taking the chance of complying and engaging in protracted and risky litigation about the
amount of compensation due afterwards.
A less apparent danger to the viability and quality of our health care system from
the uncertain state of our Takings Clause jurisprudence in this area is what some scholars
have called “demoralization costs.”133 This is the likelihood that a property owner,
knowing that the compensation she receives will be inadequate if her property is taken,
will fail to maintain the property or use it properly.134 A hospital that knows that that it is
unlikely to receive adequate compensation for its losses if it is designated as an isolation
or quarantine facility, has little economic incentive to build additional capacity or invest
in additional equipment in anticipation of a pandemic, if the additional space and
equipment are unlikely to be used when there is no pandemic.135 As hospitals realize the
uncertainty of adequate compensation to make up for their designation as an isolation or
quarantine center, they will be more and more likely to resist such designations in any
way legally possible. Hospitals may choose to make themselves less attractive targets for
public health authorities seeking isolation or quarantine centers by channeling funds
133
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away from pandemic preparedness. Instead, hospitals may shy away from the possibility
of becoming isolation or quarantine centers, hoping instead to reap the benefits of
receiving more lucrative business that isolation and quarantine centers will have to turn
away. This demoralization cost is a creeping detriment to the population’s health care.
B.

FederalStatutory and Regulatory Authorities
A small number of diseases are subject to federal quarantine authority.136

Expenses for the care and treatment of persons quarantined pursuant to federal quarantine
authority may be paid for by the United States Public Health Service.137 For all other
diseases, state and local governments have primary responsibility for isolation and
quarantine within their borders.138 Federal authorities do not apply until the Director of
the Centers for Disease Control determines that measures taken by state or local
authorities are inadequate to prevent the spread of a communicable disease outside of a
state.139
This does not mean that there will be no federal assistance available to assist
hospitals in the event of an infectious disease pandemic. Federal statutes such as the
Stafford Act140 and the Public Health Service Act141 specify certain conditions under
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which the federal government will contribute resources, personnel, and financial aid in
the event of a public health emergency. Nevertheless, these statutes provide no assurance
that federal financial resources will be either adequate to meet the hospitals’ short-term
needs, nor are they directed towards alleviating the long-term financial effects of a
pandemic on hospitals. Rather, the vast majority of federal expenditures authorized
under these statutes are allocated to state and local governments to prepare and plan for
immediate needs during a public health emergency, such as enhanced communications
between first responders, and pre-emergency development of hospital surge capacity.142
Virtually no funds have been earmarked for alleviating the long-term financial effects of
a public health emergency on the nation’s health care delivery system. Although
spending funds to develop better disease surveillance systems and hospital surge capacity
is laudable and certainly necessary, it does not provide an economic incentive for
hospitals and other first responders to cooperate with the orders of public health
authorities during the critical early stages of an emergency.
1.

The Stafford Act

The Stafford Act is the federal government’s primary legislation designed to
alleviate the consequences of major disasters and emergencies in the United States.143 An
infectious disease pandemic falls within the Stafford Act’s definition of an
“emergency.”144 The President can declare that an emergency exists only upon the
request of the Governor of an affected state.145 The Governor must base her request on a
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finding that the “situation is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is
beyond the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that Federal
Assistance is necessary.”146
In the context of an infectious disease pandemic, the requirement that a public
official admit that the situation is beyond the capabilities of the local governments is a
serious disincentive to declaring an emergency. There is a serious stigma and
accompanying loss of revenue that surrounds a geographic area, industry, or even
building that becomes associated in the public’s mind with an infectious disease. For
example, during the outbreak of an influenza virus in 1976 at Fort Dix, New Jersey, that
became known as the “swine flu” because the type of influenza virus involved was
normally a pig virus, pig farmers complained that the name “swine flu” might frighten
people away from eating pork.147

They suggested renaming the flu the “New Jersey

flu.”148 New Jersey officials, concerned about the effect the name “New Jersey flu”
would have on the state’s image, vigorously resisted this moniker.149
More recently, worldwide reaction to the SARS outbreak was delayed because of
China’s fear that news of SARS would negatively impact local economies, particularly
before the upcoming Chinese New Year.150 During the SARS outbreak in Taiwan, the
Taiwanese Health Department fined three physicians the equivalent of $2,600, and three
hospitals the equivalent of $43,000 each for covering up or delaying the reporting of
possible SARS cases.151 The City of Toronto and the Province of Ontario are currently
146
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defending several lawsuits based on their alleged failure to take appropriate measures to
control the outbreak of SARS, allegedly because of their desire to preserve the public
image of Toronto and not alarm the international community.152

Therefore, federal

assistance triggered by a declaration under the Stafford Act is likely to be delayed until
the situation is dire enough to override the legitimate stigma concerns of local business
interests and politicians.
Nevertheless, once the President declares a federal emergency, federal emergency
assistance is available to the affected area to support its efforts to “save lives, protect
property and public health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe.”153
Total assistance for a single emergency cannot exceed $5,000,000, unless the President
determines that continued assistance is immediately required because of a continuing and
immediate risk to lives, property, public health or safety, and that there is no other
assistance available.154 Under the Stafford Act, the federal government is the payer of
last resort; an applicant for aid under the Act must exhaust all other sources of aid first,
including private insurance.155 The United States may recoup federal assistance if it
duplicates benefits available to the person from another source.156
When an emergency declared under the Stafford Act involves public health needs
or a developing potential medical situation, federal assistance is delivered pursuant to the
structure set forth in the Department of Health and Human Services Emergency Support
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Function #8 (ESF 8).157 ESF 8 specifies the types of supplemental federal assistance
available to state and local governments to meet the health and medical needs of victims
of emergencies.158 The federal assistance authorized under ESF 8 is in the form of
administration and coordination.159 ESF 8 specifically states that “[A]rrangements for
definitive medical care are primarily a local function. Requests for additional assistance
should first be referred to State authorities.”160 ESF 8 does not provide for any federal
involvement in the after-effects of a public health emergency, economic or otherwise, on
the nation’s hospitals.
2.

The Public Health Service Act

The Stafford Act is not the only federal legislation applicable to a public health
emergency situation. The Public Health Service Act161 (PHSA) specifically addresses the
powers and role of the federal government during public health and medical
emergencies.162 Under the PHSA, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services can declare a public health emergency, and may make grants and provide
awards for expenses to entities involved in responding to such an emergency.163 The
Secretary’s declaration of a public health emergency automatically expires after 90 days,
subject to renewal.164

The PHSA establishes a “Public Health Emergency Fund”

157

Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Health and Medical Services Annex,
Emergency Support Function #8 (January 2003), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml (last visited March 13, 2006)
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id. at 14.
161
42 U.S.C.S. §201 et seq. (2002).
162
United States Department of Health and Human Services, Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) for
Public Health and Medical Emergencies at 4 (March 2004), available at http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/
(last visited March 13, 2006).
163
42 U.S.C.S. §247d(a) (April 2005 supplement).
164
Id.

41

available to the Secretary in the event she declares a public health emergency.165
Although the fund was previously required to have a balance of $30 million at the
beginning of each fiscal year, current legislation does not establish any specific funding
level for the fund.166 Expenditures from the fund are designed to meet short-term public
health emergency needs; they can only be made while a declaration of a public health
emergency is in effect.167 The fund is designed to supplement, not supplant, other
financial resources available for public health activities.168
The PHSA was amended in June 2002 specifically for the purpose of enhancing
the United States’ preparedness for a large-scale public health emergency.169 In addition
to the Public Health Emergency Fund,170 the Response Act contains a number of
provisions earmarking federal funds for preparation for a public health emergency. There
are funds earmarked for assessing national needs to combat threats to the public health,171
for grants to States or local authorities to assess public health threats,172 for grants to
improve State and local public health agency preparedness,173 for grants to improve State,
local, and hospital preparedness for a public health emergency,174 and for grants for
community-hospital partnerships to prepare for a public health emergency.175 For fiscal
year 2003, over 1.6 billion dollars in federal funds was allocated for these purposes.176
The funds can be expended for a variety of planning and preparedness functions,
165
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including response training for health care professionals, enhancing worker safety in the
event of a bioterror attack, and simulations and exercises to test the capability and
timeliness of public health emergency responses.177
The Response Act also enhanced the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS),
which is specifically designed to augment the country’s emergency medical response
capability during a public health emergency.178 The NDMS may be activated by the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to provide medical services
to the victims of a public health emergency, even if a public health emergency has not
been declared under the PHSA.179 Private hospitals may voluntarily join the NDMS by
entering into an agreement with NDMS.180

Hospitals agreeing to join NDMS agree to

commit a number of their available acute-care beds for NDMS patients.181 The number
of beds committed may be adjusted at will by the hospital, even after the NDMS is
activated.182 To date, approximately 1,818 hospitals have committed approximately
110,605 acute-care beds to the NDMS program.183 Although at first glance, this sounds
promising, even in a normal year flu patients occupy over 114,000 hospital beds.184
Obviously, hospitals are not eagerly lining up to contribute beds to the NDMS in
sufficient numbers to make a even a dent in the bed capacity that will be needed in even a
moderate influenza pandemic, of the type modeled by the Centers for Disease Control.185
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It appears that further incentives are necessary to enlist sufficient numbers of hospitals
for the NDMS to have any real effect during a public health emergency.
One reason for the lackluster hospital response to the NDMS might be financial.
Although hospitals that admit NDMS patients are assured that they will be reimbursed by
the federal government, the only reimbursement contemplated is for the actual
expenditures incurred in furtherance of the program.186

The legislation authorizing

appropriations to pay for the program does not specify a method for calculating the
amounts that will be paid to hospitals for each bed occupied by an NDMS patient. It is
left to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to provide the resources necessary to
reimburse expenditures carried out in furtherance of the program.187 A hospital might
easily decide that the reimbursement contemplated is too uncertain for it to take the risks
associated with designating beds as NDMS beds, and making itself an attractive isolation
or quarantine center in the event of a pandemic. Without any understanding of what
payment will be made for beds committed to the NDMS, hospitals are likely to decline to
join the NDMS, or quickly withdraw their beds from the program at the start of an
emergency, if beds are filled with more lucrative paying patients at that time. Even if its
beds are not filled, hospitals are unlikely to want to run the risk of losing whatever more
lucrative business they do have at the beginning of a pandemic by designating empty
beds to the NDMS and running the risk that their elective surgery and orthopedic
patients, whose payors bear the brunt of the cost-shifting done by hospitals, will need to
be relocated to other hospitals.
3. Federal Administrative Preparations for Public Health Emergencies
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Although there is an enormous amount of money earmarked for public health
emergency preparedness through these legislative schemes, there is confusion about the
amount and character of funds earmarked for actual direct payment to health care
providers responding to a public health emergency. And there is no money allocated by
the federal government for providers to deal with the economic aftermath of a pandemic.
For example, in November 2005, the President released the National Strategy for
Pandemic Influenza, coupled with a request to Congress for $7.1 billion in funding.188
The request included $251 million to detect and contain outbreaks before they spread
around the world; $2.8 billion to accelerate development of cell-culture technology; $800
million for development of new treatments and vaccines; $1.519 billion for the
Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS) and Defense to purchase influenza
vaccines; $1.029 billion to stockpile antiviral medications; and $644 million to ensure
that all levels of government are prepared to respond to a pandemic outbreak.189 Along
with the National Strategy, the Department of Health and Human Services released its
more detailed Pandemic Influenza Plan.

HHS’s Pandemic Influenza Plan provides

further details of how the bounty of federal preparedness funds authorized in response to
the President’s request are to be expended.190 The Plan sets forth a detailed operational
framework for prevention, preparedness, evaluation, response, containment and recovery
from an influenza pandemic.191 It specifically describes who is responsible for what
activities amongst the various federal agencies with overlapping responsibilities in the
area of public health.
188
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In contrast to this specificity for responsibilities during a public health emergency,
the Plan is very vague about whose obligation it is to pay for care once a public health
emergency is declared, and through what agency the money will flow. This vagueness is
echoed in the more general Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) for Public Health and
Medical Emergencies that was previously promulgated by the Department of Health and
Human Services.192 CONOPS merely states that funding for the activities described in the
Plan will be provided through direct and supplemental appropriations and
reimbursements.193 CONOPS also notes that the States could be made to reimburse the
federal government for certain activities carried out during a public health emergency
under the PHSA, setting the stage for widespread wrangling about payment
responsibilities not only between private insurers and the government, providers and local
authorities, local authorities and state agencies, and between state agencies themselves,
but between the federal government and the states as well.194 The knowledge that even
the states and the federal government have not agreed on who will pay for care during a
public health emergency is hardly an incentive for swift provider compliance with local
public health authority orders that the provider knows will cause it economic injury.
As far as the economic aftermath of a public health emergency is concerned, the
discussion of recovery in CONOPS is limited to a brief statement regarding demobilizing
the Secretary’s Emergency Response Team, and an assurance that there are medical and
mental health services available to agency workers after deployment.195 Consistent with
the federal statutory assumption that a public health emergency is a short-lived, limited
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scope phenomenon and that direct provision of medical care is a primarily local concern,
CONOPS does little to address the after-effects of a public health emergency on the
nation’s health care delivery system, economic or otherwise.
C.

State and local authorities
The authority to isolate or quarantine in the event of a public health emergency

varies widely from state to state.196 The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
(MSEHPA) provides some common ground for assessing the availability of
compensation from state and local public health authorities for hospitals following the
orders of authorities during a public health emergency.197 The MSEHPA specifies that
compensation for property taken by a public health authority during a public health
emergency shall be calculated in accordance with the applicable laws of eminent domain
in a non-emergent situation.198 Unless a state’s constitution has been interpreted to
provide compensation beyond that contemplated under the United States Constitution in a
temporary regulatory taking situation, a hospital located in a state that follows the
MSEHPA would thus find itself in the constitutional Takings Clause netherworld
described in Part ___, supra., after acting as an isolation or quarantine center during a
pandemic.
States that have not adopted this provision of the MSEHPA do not necessarily
have laws that are more likely than the MSEHPA to assure hospital compliance with
orders of public health authorities. For example, New Jersey, the most densely populated
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state with a population of over 8.5 million people, considers itself to be particularly
vulnerable to the importation and spread of infectious disease.199 Over half a million
people commute between New York and New Jersey every day, making the interstate
spread of disease during a pandemic very likely in the region.200 Recognizing its potential
vulnerability to an influenza pandemic, New Jersey has a lengthyand detailed draft
Influenza Pandemic Plan.201 The Plan was developed in close collaboration with partner
organizations throughout the state, and reviewed by both public and private sector
stakeholders.202 The Plan recognizes that because of the likely scope and duration of an
influenza pandemic, it will be difficult to shift resources between states, and the state
must plan to be self-reliant.203 The Plan acknowledges that influenza prophylaxis and
treatment during a pandemic will predominantly be the responsibility of individuals and
organizations in the private sector, and that voluntary compliance by the private sector
with guidelines and directives from governmental agencies is needed.204 New Jersey also
acknowledges that the pre-pandemic period is the critical period for determining the
impact of the pandemic on health care resources.205
Despite the apparent awareness of New Jersey public health authorities that
cooperation from the private health care sector will be critical in a public health
emergency, the Plan contains no provisions for alleviating the immediate or long-term
economic impact the private health care sector is likely to experience from treating

199

New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Influenza Pandemic Plan at 12 (Draft, February
1, 2006), available at http://www.cste.org/specialprojects/Influenzaplans/StateMap.asp.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 2.
203
Id.
204
Id. To facilitate private sector cooperation, New Jersey has provided an “Influenza Pandemic Plan
Guide for Health Care Facilities,” available at http://nj.gov/health/flu/pandemic.shtml.
205
Id.

48

victims of an influenza pandemic.206

In fact, the plan acknowledges that the economic

impact of an influenza pandemic will be significant, but then states that this is not within
the purview of the public health response plan.207

The closest the Plan comes to

addressing the problem is a promise that the New Jersey Department of Health and
Senior Services Office of the State Epidemiologist will coordinate a state-wide effort to
assess the impact of the pandemic on health care resources and prepare a report with
recommendations for the future when the pandemic is over.208
It is doubtful that the assurance that the authorities will prepare a report with
recommendations will be sufficient to persuade hospitals and other first responders to
comply with the orders of public health authorities designating them as isolation or
quarantine centers. The New Jersey Constitution’s Takings Clause has been construed to
be coextensive with the United States Constitution’s Takings Clause.

209

Given the

uncertainty that compensation will be available to hospitals from traditional takings
clause analysis, this is a recipe for defiance rather than cooperation in the event of a
pandemic.
California, a populous state in close proximity to Asia and a large immigrant population,
acknowledges that a pandemic is likely to affect everyone in California, and that no
amount of planning will allow response to a major pandemic to be “business as usual.”210
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The California Department of Health, in its Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and
Response Plan, estimates that 35% of the population could become ill with influenza in
the event of a pandemic, and that there could be more than 35,000 deaths.211 The
Department of Health acknowledges that a pandemic could continue for months, or even
years, and will require a sustained health facility response.212 The Plan’s objectives for
healthcare planning are to maintain to the greatest extent possible the provision of
healthcare services sufficient to meet the needs of all Californians during an influenza
pandemic, as well as respond to the healthcare needs of pandemic victims and coordinate
that response amongst providers.213

In order to accomplish this, the public health

authorities are exploring their legal authority to require hospitals to cancel elective
surgeries or otherwise develop capacity in anticipation of a pandemic.214 Yet the Plan
says nothing about assuring private sector health care providers that they will be
compensated for the economic damage they are likely to experience if they comply with
the orders of public health authorities designating them as isolation or quarantine centers.
The California Supreme Court has characterized a “somewhat broader” range of
valuation for property taken by the government under the California Constitution, but
otherwise, the state and federal Takings Clauses are construed identically.215 Without
any financial assurances beyond the vagaries of litigation under the Takings Clause,
private hospitals are likely to succumb to the “not in my backyard” syndrome, and do
whatever they can to avoid being associated with the pandemic, at least in the critical
early stages.
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IV.

ENSURING THAT HOSPITALS ACT IN THE INTERESTS OF
PUBLIC HEALTH DURING A PANDEMIC

Current law is inadequate to ensure that hospitals will be completely compensated
if they comply with the orders of public health authorities during the critical early stages
of an infectious disease pandemic.

Thus, it does nothing to encourage provider

compliance with such orders in the face of countervailing economic self-interests. In
order to be reassured that they will not be forced out of business if they comply with such
orders, hospitals must be assured of three things: that they will be paid for the actual
costs of caring for victims of a pandemic; that they will be paid for lost revenue from
disruption of their routine business and their inability to cost-shift while designated as an
isolation or quarantine center; and that they will receive adequate compensation after the
pandemic is over to make up for the loss of goodwill they are likely to face due to being
designated as the “pesthouse” during a pandemic. If we can ensure that these three
elements loss will be compensated, we can ensure that our hospital managers will act in
the public interest in the face of a pandemic, rather than act contrary to the public interest
in the interests of economic self-preservation. We can ensure that we will still have a
functioning health care delivery system after the pandemic is over. The remainder of this
article proposes that an efficient way to provide these three elements of compensation to
hospitals and ensure the public’s health is through collaboration between the public and
the private sectors, taking advantage of their respective areas of expertise.
A.

Amending Current Disaster and Emergency Laws to Assure Prompt
Payment for the Direct Costs of Care
During the thick of a public health emergency, quick economic relief to hospitals

is of paramount importance. Our existing emergency and disaster relief laws should
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clearly provide for direct payments to hospitals in the throes of dealing with pandemic
disease, regardless of whether they are acting pursuant to a Stafford Act declaration or
pursuant to the orders of local public health officials. After the crisis has been alleviated,
the law should provide for the government to recoup costs that it expended caring for
sick patients from private health insurers who should have covered the costs of caring for
their sick beneficiaries under the terms of their contracts with providers. This will
prevent insurers from receiving a windfall at the expense of the public, and postpone the
inevitable arguing about who is responsible for payment for the treatment of pandemic
victims until the pandemic subsides and the immediate public health crisis is over.
Although federal and state laws are full of preparedness initiatives, and substantial
funding from all levels of government has been directed towards preparedness, confusion
reigns about who will pay for what when pandemic victims are actually hospitalized.216
Although some hospitals have accumulated large reserves in recent years, and may be
able to handle the disruption in their revenue streams that will inevitably occur when they
are responding to a pandemic, many hospitals operate at the edge of solvency.217 In order
to ensure that hospitals and other first responders have funds readily available to survive
the interruption of their normal revenue streams, Congress should implement legislation
earmarking some of the dollars allocated for influenza and pandemic preparedness for a
reserve fund designed to pay for the care of pandemic victims as it is rendered. In
keeping with the philosophy expressed in ESF 8 that arranging for medical care is
primarily a local function, and to ensure that the federal government does not encroach
216
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on state police powers that are reserved to the states, the reserves could be held at the
state and local level in secure, interest-bearing accounts, and access could be limited to
the chief public health official of a political subdivision. With the knowledge that funds
to compensate them are actually available and under the control of the local chief public
health official, it is far more likely that hospitals will comply with the orders of that
official and perform their duties without resistance.218 If the payment level associated
with the treatment of pandemic victims is sufficient, hospitals and other first responders
may even be eager to carry out the orders of public health authorities as part of their
charitable missions, rather than reluctantly complying.
In order to be effective, the payment made to a hospital for each pandemic victim
treated must be sufficient to at least cover the hospital’s costs of care. The payment must
include compensation for any “combat pay” the hospital must offer its staff to get them to
care for pandemic victims.

State Medicaid payment levels, for instance, would be

insufficient to ensure compliance.219 Federal legislation establishing reserve accounts
should specify that the payment rates established by local public health authorities must
compensate for the actual costs of providing care for patients with symptoms similar to
pandemic victims (to the extent comparisons are possible), as well as additional costs that
are likely to be incurred by the hospital in providing medical personnel to care for such
patients, such as incentive bonuses to staff. Setting the rates will require careful study of
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the rates paid by various insurers to hospitals caring for their beneficiaries with specific
conditions or illnesses, the costs of providing this care, and the prevailing wages paid to
medical personnel in the area. Much of this data is currently gathered by the Department
of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, for use in
setting hospital Medicare reimbursement.220 Additional research in the area could be
funded by the federal government as part of emergency preparedness activities.
B.

Insuring Against the Loss of the Ability to Cost-Shift During a Pandemic
It would be sound public policy to encourage hospitals to view the risks of loss

associated with infectious disease pandemics as they view other risks of loss from natural
disasters, such as fire and flood, and prepare ahead of time for such losses by insuring for
them. Many businesses purchase private “business interruption insurance” to protect
themselves from the risks of interruptions to their revenue streams due to natural or manmade disasters.
Private business interruption insurance is designed to indemnify an insured
against losses arising from an inability to operate a commercial establishment in a normal
manner because of a natural or man-made disaster. 221 Currently, the majority of such
policies limit coverage to interruptions from events for which an insurer has significant
actuarial experience, such as fire, flood, tornado, or hurricane.222 And even then, the
insurance is only triggered by physical damage to the policyholder’s property, and only
covers the insured for the time period necessary to rebuild, replace, or repair physical
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damage to property.223 Standard business interruption insurance would therefore be
useless to a hospital faced with the loss of its revenue stream from its most lucrative lines
of day-to-day business (such as elective surgeries) because of a designation as an
isolation or quarantine center, rather than due to some physical damage to the facility.
Therefore, in order for the compensation scheme to work, state insurance
regulators would have to mandate the terms of business interruption insurance that
insurers must offer to hospitals. They would have to disapprove any policy language that
excludes coverage for losses incurred due to compliance with the orders of public health
authorities, and thus create “public health emergency business interruption insurance”
(PHEBII) available to hospitals.
Although state mandating of the terms of PHEBII is a necessary first step, it is
highly unlikely that it will suffice to create a private market in PHEBII on its own. The
private insurance market has already demonstrated its unwillingness to insure against
risks associated with public health emergencies and threats of infectious disease
pandemics; risks that have historically been perceived as a government problem.224 For
example, in 1976, believing that a potentially deadly influenza pandemic of swine flu was
imminent, the federal government undertook a national swine flu vaccine program.225
Almost immediately, the vaccine manufacturers’ insurers refused to provide liability
insurance to the manufacturers for adverse effects associated with the vaccine.226
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Concerned about the potentially enormous numbers of claims and uncertain of the
amounts associated with the claims due to lack of prior claims experience, private
insurers took the position that if the public was endangered, then the government should
take the risk.227 Congress, however, was unconvinced that it should do so. Ultimately,
the impasse was broken when Congress passed legislation committing the federal
government to insuring the swine flu vaccine manufacturers against claims that the
vaccine injured people.228
There is no reason to believe that private insurers will react differently to being
told by state regulators to cover a business interruption due to a public health emergency
than they reacted during the swine flu public health emergency. And after a public health
emergency occurs, insurance for its effects will likely be virtually impossible to obtain at
any price, just as terrorism insurance was virtually unavailable in the days following
9/11, even at very high prices.229 Faced with state insurance regulation forcing them to
take what they consider unknowable and unquantifiable risk, business interruption
insurers are likely to pull out of the market in a particular state rather than comply,
leaving the hospitals in the state no better off than they were before state coverage
mandates were instituted.
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After 9/11, in response to the private market’s refusal to provide terrorism
insurance, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA).230 The
TRIA is a useful model for the public-private collaboration contemplated by the PHEBII
proposed in this article.

Under the TRIA any person who offers property or casualty

insurance in the United States must offer terrorism insurance as well.231 To address
concerns that the government was mandating the insurance industry to take an
unknowable, unquantifiable amount of risk, and responding to threats that insurers would
pull out of the market completely, the TRIA also provides federal reinsurance for losses
incurred by the insurers due to terrorism after payment of a significant deductible
amount.232 The insurers must also pay a 10% coinsurance above the deductible for 2006,
rising to 15% in 2007, before government funding is available.233 Total public and
private liability for losses due to terrorism is capped at $100 billion.234

Federal

compensation is only available when the Secretaries of the Treasury and State certify that
an “act of terrorism” has occurred, and only if industry insured losses nationwide exceed
$50 million in 2006 and $100 million in 2007.235

The government will recoup a

significant amount of any payments it makes for terrorism losses through a surcharge on
property and casualty policyholders, regardless of whether or not the policyholders have
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purchased terrorism insurance.236

The TRIA has been embraced by the insurance

industry, who lobbied for its extension for an additional two years.237
Legislation similar to the TRIA could be used to ensure that hospitals are insured
against losses of revenue due to pandemics and their compliance with the orders of public
health officials during a pandemic. Such legislation would require all purveyors of
business interruption insurance to offer PHEBII, yet take much of the sting out of the
requirement by having the federal government insure the insurance industry against
excess risk.

Unlike the TRIA, which does not require a policyholder to purchase

terrorism insurance, in the exercise of their police power and to safeguard our health care
delivery system, states could and should require hospitals to purchase PHEBII as part of
their licensure requirements. Naturally occurring infectious disease pandemics, unlike
mass terrorist events, are relatively predictable occurrences. Although each pandemic
differs with regard to its penetration and mortality rates among the general public, we
have sufficient experience with infectious disease and projections of costs for actuaries to
use for initial premium calculations. Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to require
hospitals to purchase PHEBII, and many of the criticisms that have been levied against
the TRIA because of the unquantifiable nature of risks associated with terrorism are less
applicable to losses associated with a more predictable pandemic.
This public reinsurer-private insurer collaboration minimizes many of the
problems inherent in a private insurance scheme. Requiring hospitals to purchase PHEBII
eliminates any possibility of adverse selection. “Adverse selection” refers to the tendency
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of only high-risk customers to purchase available insurance.238 Without a mandatory
purchase requirement, it is highly likely that only hospitals that are most likely to become
isolation or quarantine centers would decide to purchase PHEBII.239

This would

artificially inflate the premiums charged for the insurance, and prevent insurers from
spreading the risk amongst a balanced cross-section of the nation’s hospitals, urban and
rural, large and small. In the absence of a requirement of universal purchase of PHEBII
by hospitals, when there is a pandemic, the insurers would be likely to have to pay an
enormous amount of claims, and will go out of business.240 Requiring hospitals to
purchase PHEBII as a condition of licensure protects the hospitals, the insurers, and the
public, and will keep the rates affordable by allowing the insurers to properly spread risk.
The problem of adverse selection may be minimal anyway in the context of
PHEBII because of the inherent random nature of an infectious disease pandemic.
Typically, adverse selection occurs because the policyholder has information, that the
insurer does not have, suggesting that an insurable event is likely to occur.241 The insurer
cannot adjust the premium rates to reflect the appropriate level of risk without this
information, and thus, winds up paying out far more than it anticipated. In contrast,
hospitals have no more knowledge about where and when a pandemic could occur than
potential insurers. Because the insureds and the insurers are on a level playing field as
far as knowing the where, when, and magnitude of a potential pandemic, there would
probably be less adverse selection in the context of this type of private takings insurance
than in other types of insurance, even if hospitals were not required to purchase PHEBII.
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Another commonly discussed problem in private insurance is moral hazard.242
Moral hazard occurs in the insurance marketplace when the insured can take action that
affects the probability or the magnitude of the event that triggers an insurance
payment.243 A classic example is a landowner with a fire insurance policy who becomes
less diligent in clearing combustibles away from his house.244 In the context of PHEBII,
an insurer might be concerned that a hospital suffering financially woulddo something to
make it more likely that the insurer will have to pay under the insurance policy, such as
failing to resist designation as an isolation or quarantine center.245

Unlike the typical

moral hazard situation, in the context of pandemic preparedness, this is actually a
desirable outcome from a public health perspective.
The public-private collaborative nature of this model also eliminates many of the
problems inherent in a purely public compensation scheme. One of the major problems
that appears when the government institutes a scheme of publicly funded compensation
for some perceived social ill is the phenomenon of rent-seeking. Rent-seeking occurs
when a constituent who may be entitled to a payout under a public compensation scheme
uses political or other means to try to fit all adverse events that affect the constituent
within the category of adverse events for which the scheme is designed to compensate.246
In the context of PHEBII, the danger is that insurers will attempt to fit all outbreaks of
infectious disease into the category of a major pandemic, so that the reinsurance
provisions of the legislation would be triggered. This propensity towards rent-seeking,
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however, will be quashed by the existence of a substantial deductible and coinsurance
that must be paid by the insurer before any federal assistance becomes available.247 Only
in a truly dangerous and costly pandemic situation, where the economic losses are high
enough to dwarf the payout that the private insurers will make via their deductibles,
would it be worth the insurers’ while to seek reinsurance. In such a situationm, the
government will likely have already declared a state of public health emergency.
C.

Interpreting the Takings Clause to Require Compensation for Lost Goodwill
and Going Concern Value After a Pandemic
In addition to ensuring that hospitals comply with public health dictates during a

pandemic, it is in the public’s interest to ensure that we have a functioning health care
delivery system after the pandemic ends. Congress and state legislatures should pass
legislation requiring compensation for provable loss of goodwill and going concern value
when the government effects a temporary regulatory taking of a going business concern
to protect the public health.
The loss that a hospital faces when it is designated as an isolation or quarantine
center is not only the loss of its ability to cost-shift during and after a pandemic, but also
the lingering damage to the hospital’s reputation caused by such a designation. Such a
loss is not insignificant. With regard to the SARS epidemic of 2003, hospital counsel has
opined that “the mere mention of SARS in the same sentence with the name of a specific
health care facility can create panic among patients and families, and cause significant
damage to the facility’s reputation as well as its ability to continue to treat patients.”248
For the majority of hospitals, which depend on the ability to attract privately insured
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patients to subsidize care for publicly insured and uninsured patients, such a stigma could
mean the difference between continued existence and shutting the hospital’s doors.
We are unlikely to be able to change the public’s attitude towards isolation and
quarantine facilities through law. But we can change the law to compensate hospitals and
other first responders so they can survive until the public’s memory of a pandemic and
association of the hospital with the pandemic dissipates. The Takings Clause is a
reflection of society’s acknowledgement that if the government takes away a person’s
private property for the benefit of society, then society as a whole should pay.249 The
United States Supreme Court has said that the purpose of the Takings Clause is “to bar
the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”250 No government action
could yield a greater benefit to society than a taking to ensure that the public’s health is
protected, and that the sick are cared for. If any burden should in fairness and justice be
borne by the public as a whole, it should be the burden of protecting the public’s health.
When the government takes a hospital for use as an isolation or quarantine center
during a public health emergency, it is taking not only the real property, equipment, and
physical improvements to the property. It is counting on the expertise of the hospital’s
staff and the hospital’s reputation as a provider of quality health care to assure the public
that the situation is under control. As such, the government is taking and using the
hospital’s goodwill for the duration of the emergency. Under established Takings Clause
jurisprudence, the government pays for what it gets and what it can and does use. It is
not much of a stretch to require compensation for goodwill in such a circumstance.
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And when the emergency is over, because of the stigma attached to a place
where there has been a concentration of infectious disease, the government has used up or
destroyed the hospital’s goodwill. This leaves the hospital owners with no alternatives
but to start over, without the goodwill that they spent many years creating. The Model
Eminent Domain Code recognizes that in situations where loss of goodwill is caused by
the taking of the property, cannot reasonably be prevented by relocating the business or
taking other reasonable steps, and will not be otherwise compensated, the business owner
should be compensated for the loss.251 It is consistent with the intent of the Takings
Clause for Congress and state legislatures to mandate that loss of goodwill be considered
compensable property when a hospital is designated by the public health authorities as an
isolation or quarantine center. Legislation requiring compensation for goodwill in such a
situation will remove the uncertainty inherent in leaving the determination of whether any
compensation will be paid for loss of goodwill to the courts. It will also act as a check on
rash or unfounded action by the government that adversely affects hospitals, but does
little to further the public’s health, such as the premature designation of a hospital as an
isolation facility.
Even with such legislation, the government and the hospital may disagree about
the amount of compensation due the hospital because of the government’s actions. To
further minimize uncertainty over the potential amount of compensation for lost
goodwill, and to minimize the expenses and vagaries inherent in using the courts to
determine this amount, Congress could earmark a proportion of the emergency
preparedness funds now being expended to commission studies on the effects of prior
epidemics on public attitudes towards hospitals in nations that suffered from epidemics in
251
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recent years, and develop projections of the effects of a pandemic on the goodwill of
American hospitals. The projections could be used to develop a table for compensating
hospitals for loss of goodwill based on the size, type, and location of the hospital, and the
severity of the pandemic. A mediation or arbitration mechanism could be included in the
legislation to resolve any claims by a particular hospital that the table does not
completely compensate it for the government’s actions.252 The assurance that payment
for lost goodwill is mandated provided the hospital can prove the loss, coupled with the
uninterrupted revenue stream provided the hospital during the public health emergency
through the emergency reserve fund and PHEBII discussed above, would be a giant step
towards ensuring that hospitals have no reason to shy away from designations as isolation
or quarantine centers.
V.

CONCLUSION

We know it is not a matter of if, but of when, an infectious disease pandemic will
strike the United States. We can place our reliance on the wonders of modern medicine,
and the good intentions and charitable missions of our institutional and individual health
care providers, to ensure that we are cared for when we are sick, and hope for the best.
Chances are that we will be cared for in some fashion during the immediate crisis of a
public health emergency. But given the state of our crumbling health care safety net, the
increase in the number of for-profit hospitals in the country, and the paper-thin margins
on which many of the nation’s hospitals operate, chances are that hospitals will resist any
order to take actions that are harmful to their bottom lines. This instinct for economic
self-preservation could endanger the public’s health and rob us of our best chance to
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minimize or avoid the most severe consequences of a pandemic. And even if they
comply with the orders of public health authorities, it is likely that when the immediate
crisis passes, many of the hospitals that the most poor and vulnerable of our citizens rely
on to provide them with care will not survive the economic damage caused by the actions
they took and the choices they made in the public interest.
During the past decade, our federal, state, and local governments have
acknowledged the need for preparedness in the face of a public health emergency by
passing legislation allocating large amounts of money to “preparedness” activities.
Recognizing the need for public health emergency preparedness is a good thing.
Nevertheless, despite this sudden cascade of resources for planning activities, our
nation’s hospitals are in no better position to economically survive a public health
emergency than they were before the resources appeared.

As Justice Brandeis has

observed, “[v]alue is a word of many meanings.”253 Rather than continuing to beef up
our bureaucracies and filter dollars through layers of government in the name of
“emergency preparedness,” Congress and state legislatures could get better value for our
dollars by using the existing public health bureaucracy and the expertise of private
insurers to set up a system that ensures that our first responders will actually be available
during a public health emergency, will be provide the care needed by the public, and will
survive the emergency to continue to provide the care the public needs in the future.
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